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RECENT DECISIONS
TORTS-INDEMNIFICATION ACTION BY UNITED STATES AGAINST
FEDERAL EMPLOYEE DIsALLowED.-In a suit brought under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act,' the United States was held liable for the neg-
ligence of its employee, Gilman. Prior to the adjudication of its
liability, the United States, seeking indemnification, moved to im-
plead Gilman pursuant to Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.2
The Supreme Court held that in the absence of any legislative provi-
sion for indemnification the United States could not assert such a
right against a wrongdoing employee. United States v. Gilman, 347
U.S. 507 (1954).
The common-law right of indemnity permits an employer who
has been held liable for the tort of his employee to recover the amount
he has paid from the erring employee.3 This right has been based
upon both the theory of quasi-contract, and that of breach of an in-
dependent duty owed to the employer. The former theory proceeds
on the rationale that the employee would be unjustly enriched if the
employer had to bear the financial burden which the employee ought,
in equity and good conscience, to have sustained. Therefore, a legally
implied duty on the part of the employee to reimburse his employer
may be enforced. 4 In explaining the theory of breach of an inde-
pendent duty owed to the employer, Chief Judge Cardozo wrote:
"The servant owes the duty to the master to render faithful service,
and must answer for the damage if the quality of the service is lower
than the standard." 6
The Court of Appeals applied the quasi-contract theory of lia-
bility to the facts of the instant case.6 It was stated that the Gov-
ernment was not paying a claim which the employee ought to pay,7
because the Federal Tort Claims Act bars an action by the claimant
against the employee after judgment has been obtained against the
United States.8 Thus recovery was denied. This reasoning ignores
1 "The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title
relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual... ." 62 STAT. 983 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §2674 (1952).
2 "Before the service of his answer a defendant may move ... for leave
as a third-party plaintiff to serve a summons and complaint upon a person not
a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against him." FED. R Civ. P. 14(a).
3 See PRossER, TORTS 1114 (1941); RESTATEiENT, RESTITUTION § 96
(1937); 2 R.STATEmENT, AGENCY § 401, comment c (1933).
4 See Gilman v. United States, 206 F.2d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1953);
MUN MAN, QUASI-CONTRACTS 10, 18-20 (1950); RFSTATEmENT, RESTITUTION
327-330 (1937); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors,
81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 130, 146-147 (1932).
5 Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 257, 164 N.E.
42, 43 (1928).
6 See Gilman v. United States, supra note 4.
7 Id. at 848.
s "The judgment in an action under section 1346(b) of this title shall con-
stitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same
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the fact that the employee was primarily responsible for the damage
and could have been held liable 9 if the injured party did not elect to
bring suit against the United States. Since the United States did
pay, the employee, was unjustly enriched, and since he also breached
his duty to the Government under the "independent duty" theory by
acting negligently, it follows that under either theory of indemnifi-
cation, the United States should have been allowed to recover.
In the instant decision, the Supreme Court did not allude to
either theory. Rather, it was of the opinion that the determination
of whether or not the United States should be allowed indemnity
involves complex considerations of fiscal policy and employee morale
which properly lie within the province of Congress.1" The fiscal
problem was considered to be analogous to that encountered in United
States v. Standard Oil Co." There the Government sought to re-
cover, as in a loss-of-service action, amounts expended for hospitaliza-
tion and pay of a soldier who had been injured by the defendant.12
An important factor in the decision to deny recovery was the thought
that such recovery would ". . . make whole the federal treasury for
financial losses sustained . . . from the injuries inflicted .... ," 13 The
Court believed that it was not the obligation-of the judiciary to secure
the treasury ". . . against financial losses however inflicted. .. ."
since it is the duty of Congress to determine fiscal policy.14 This
position is untenable for if the reasoning were carried to its logical
conclusion a natural result would be that the Court would in no in-
stance grant recovery in favor of the United States without con-
subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission
gave rise to the claim." 62 STAT. 984 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (1952).
9 See Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation,
35 GEo. L.J. 1, 62 n.238 (1946). For general discussions of the Act see
A Symposium on the Federal Tort Claims Act, 7 VAN. L. REv. 175-270
(1954) ; Seavey, "Liberal Construction" and the Tort Liability of the Federal
Government, 67 HARv. L. REv. 994 (1954); Yankwich, Problems Under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 9 F.R.D. 143-169 (1949) ; Note, The Courts and the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 884 (1950).10 See United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 509-513 (1954).
2 332 U.S. 301 (1947). However, in a case similar to the instant litigation
Standard Oil was distinguished, and the United States was allowed to recover
indemnity. The distinction was based upon the ground that in Standard Oil
the United States was attempting to establish a novel relationship (sovereign-
soldier) as a foundation for the maintenance of the ancient action of per qiwd
servitium amisit, while the employer-employee relationship involved in an in-
denification action has been recognized at common law as a proper basis for
allowing the action. See Burks v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 337, 339(S.D. Tex. 1953). It might also be noted that Congress was for many years
aware of the problem involved in Standard Oil and had obviously elected not
to pursue such claims, while the problem here involved is of comparatively
recent origin.
12 See United States v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 11 at 302.
as Id. at 310-311.
14 Id. at 315.
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gressional authority.15 Statutory permission, however, has not been
considered a prerequisite to the Government's assertion of common-
law rights.16
The Court in the instant case was further influenced by the fact
that Congress has not provided that federal employees bear any part
of the Government's financial burden arising from suits under the
Tort Claims Act. However, the protection of erring employees was
not the purpose of the Act.' 7 An injured party may still bring suit
against the individual who caused the harm.' 8  The only provision
that in any way affects the liability of government workers is the one
earlier referred to, which merely asserts that a judgment against the
United States is a bar to the bringing of an action by the claimant
against the actual tortfeasor. 19
In addition, the Court reasoned that the maintenance of an in-
demnification action is a disciplinary proceeding affecting employee
morale. Although it is true that the power to discipline federal em-
ployees is within the province of Congress, an indemnification action
is not disciplinary in nature. It is essentially a procedure whereby
one who has been held vicariously liable seeks to be made whole.
Discipline is not a factor either in its purpose or operation. It was
the position of the Government that morale would not be affected
because, as a practical matter, indemnification would be sought only
25 See 3 Moor., FEDnAIL PRacticE 507, 514 (2d ed. 1948).
16 See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)
("In absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to
fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards.") ; Cotton
v. United States, 11 How. 229, 231 (U.S. 1850) (In this case, an action by the
United States of trespass quare elausum fregit was sustained.) ; United States
v. Savage Truck Line, Inc., 209 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 952 (1954) (Government employees were negligent in loading airplane
engines on a truck belonging to a common carrier. The driver of the truck,
who was an employee of the carrier, had knowledge of the carelessness of the
federal employees, yet was negligent in operating the truck so as to cause
injury. The United States was held liable to the injured third party; but be-
cause the carrier had the last clear chance to prevent the accident, the court
required it to indemnify the United States.) ; see United States v. Yellow Cab
Co., 340 U.S. 543, 551 (1951) (It was stated in this case that the United States
would be permitted to implead a joint tortfeasor for the purpose of maintain-
ing an action for contribution.) ; United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S.
301, 315 n.22 (1947) ("Of course it has not been necessary for Congress to
pass statutes imposing civil liability in those situations where it has been under-
stood since the days of the common law that the sovereign is protected from
tortious interference.").
17 The Act merely pronounced the Government's legal liability in an area
where moral responsibility had long been recognized. It was designed to elim-
inate the large number of private bills for relief which were introduced into
Congress each year. See, e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-25
(1953) ; United States v. Yellow Cab Co., smpra note 16 at 548-550; Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139-140 (1950).
Is See note 9 supra.
19 See note 8 supra.
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in those situations where the employee was protected by liability
insurance.20  Thus, it would be the insurance company, rather than
the federal employee, which would bear the burden and expense of
defending an indemnity suit by the Government. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has already declared that when an insurance company sues as
subrogee of a person injured by the Government (a right not spe-
cified in the Act but one recognized by the Court) it is regarded as
the "real party in interest." 21 The Court, however, did not consider
this line of reasoning, stating that ". . . the decision we could fashion
could have no such limitations, since we deal only with a rule of
indemnity which is utterly independent of any underwriting of the
liability." 22
Although it may be argued that the instant case merely restricts
the common-law rights of the United States as to federal employees,
it has been more broadly interpreted. In United States v. Hendler,23
the court, relying on the Gilman decision, withdrew the recognized
right of the United States to collect from ex-servicemen the amount
of life insurance premiums for which it had been held liable as
guarantor. 24  Another result of this decision is the possible collusion
of federal employees with claimants who are suing the United States.25
The way is now open for bribed employees to assist in the prosecution
of manufactured claims or to sell their testimony in order to increase
the size of judgments. Moreover, claimants may now extort sums
from employees in consideration for not proceeding against them.
Prior to this case there would have been no point in the employee
paying, since they might also have been held liable to the Government.
20 See Brief for Appellants, p. 11 n.6, United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S.
507 (1954). This would seem to rebut the contention that an opposite conclu-
sion by the Court would have resulted in the burden of the loss falling upon
one person, rather than being borne by the community at large. See Note,
63 YALE L.J. 570, 573 (1954).
21 See United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 380-381
(1949). "The broad sweep of its [the Act's] language assuming the liability
of a private person, the purpose of Congress to relieve itself of consideration
of private claims, and the fact that subrogation claims made up a substantial
part of that burden are also persuasive that Congress did not intend that such
claims should be barred." Id. at 380. When such a liberal interpretation is
given the Act in an assertion of common-law rights against the sovereign, it
is difficult to understand why the Government was restricted in the instant case.22 United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 510 (1954).
23 123 F. Supp. 383 (D. Colo. 1954).
2 4Morton v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1953); United
States v. Nichols, 105 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Iowa 1952), appeal dismissed, 202
F.2d 958 (8th Cir. 1953).
25 See Gilman v. United States, 206 F.2d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 1953) (dissent-
ing opinion). Now that federal employees are no longer financially responsible
for their own conduct, they are a "different class" of workers who are to be
rewarded for laxity of conduct in the performance of their duties. Ibid.
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When the United States is subject to the liabilities of a private
employer,26 it should have the concomitant equitable rights of such
an employer. Appropriate legislation to accomplish this is necessary
to forestall the noted deleterious effects of this decision.
X
TORTS-PARENTAL IMMUNITY UPHELD IN WRONGFUL DEATH
ACTION.-An unemancipated infant plaintiff sued his mother for the
wrongful death of his father caused by her negligent operation of an
automobile. The plaintiff contended that the Nevada wrongful death
statute, which does not expressly except suits by minors, directly re-
pealed the common-law rule of immunity of a parent from suit by a
minor child. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed a summary
judgment for the defendant, holding that the wrongful death statute
did not abrogate the common-law rule. Strong v. Strong, 267 P.2d
240 (Nev. 1954).
Up to and including the latter part of the nineteenth century,
there was no rule declaring parents immune from tort actions by their
minor children.1 In 1891, the common-law rule establishing parental
immunity had its inception in the celebrated case of Hewellette v.
George.2 The Mississippi court, citing neither judicial precedent nor
text material, based its decision solely on the ground that public pol-
icy prohibited tort suits between parent and child. Thereafter, other
states adopted the rule, stating that maintenance of a suit by a child
against the parent would be disruptive of family harmony; 3 that
immunity should be extended to parents so as not to hamper their
disciplinary function; 4 that recovery by a child would result in a
depletion of the family resources to the detriment of the other chil-
dren; ri and, that the child is sufficiently protected by the criminal
laws of the state from abuse at the hands of his parent.6
The broad terms of the parental immunity rule have led to in-
justice. The most extreme application of this rule occurred in Roller
v. Roller,7 where a minor child was precluded from maintaining a
civil suit against her father who had raped her. The court para-
26 See note 1 supra.
1 See PROSsER, TORTS 905 (1941).
268 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); see PRossER, TORTS 905 (1941).
3 See Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923) ; Wick v. Wick,
192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
4 See Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932).
5 See Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
6 See Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Matarese
v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 Atl. 198 (1925).
7 See note 5 supra.
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